What happens when social transfers become instruments of abuse?

Conditional cash transfer programs (CCTs) have been widely adopted in Latin America as a social policy tool aimed at reducing poverty and fostering investment in human capital. Well-known examples include Familias en Acción (Families in Action) in Colombia and Bolsa Família (Family Stipend) in Brazil, which provide monetary transfers to the poorest households in exchange for meeting requirements related to children’s education and health. A common feature of these programs is that women are usually designated as the main recipients, based on the premise that they prioritize household well-being and ensure the use of resources for the family’s wellbeing (Molyneux, 2006).

These programs have had positive impacts on poverty indicators and access to services. However, academic literature and reports from international organizations highlight potential risks: the possible effects of these transfers on gender dynamics and violence. In particular, the potential for these transfers, rather than promoting autonomy, to be manipulated by abusers to exercise economic control over women. This concern connects with broader discussions on economic abuse as a form of gender-based violence, understood as the restriction, appropriation, or control of a person’s financial resources in order to limit their autonomy (UN Women, 2021).

Several studies have shown varied results regarding the impact of CCTs on intimate partner violence. In Mexico, research on the Oportunidades (Opportunities) social transfer program (formerly Progresa (Progress)) documented complex relationships between transfers and marital violence, with evidence that in some contexts transfers reduced violence by alleviating economic stress, while in others they generated negative reactions from men facing changes in resource control (Bobonis, Castro & Morales, 2013). Differences suggest that the programs do not produce uniform effects but instead interact with gender norms, local contexts, and household characteristics.

Transfers can impact violence in multiple ways. On the one hand, by reducing financial pressure in the household, these programs tend to decrease economic conflicts, which in some cases translates into reduced violence (Buller et al., 2018). Furthermore, the fact that women are the recipients of the transfer may improve their bargaining power within the household. However, this same shift may provoke a “backlash” among some men, who respond with more controlling or violent behaviors to reassert their position at home (Bobonis et al., 2013). The modality of payment and the visibility of the transfer are critical factors: when resources are delivered in cash and publicly, the risk of them being appropriated by partners or relatives increases, whereas electronic transfers into accounts in the woman’s name tend to reduce that vulnerability (World Bank, 2020).

Feminist critiques of CCTs have also highlighted the so-called “gender costs” of these programs. Bradshaw and Víquez (2008) argue that by concentrating responsibility for fulfilling the social conditions of transfers (such as ensuring childrens’ school attendance) on women, conditional transfers reinforce their role as caregivers and may increase their burden of unpaid work. Molyneux (2006) had previously noted that these programs are part of a “new poverty agenda” that instrumentalizes mothers as executors of social policies without necessarily expanding their margins of autonomy. These observations suggest that even when transfers aim to improve the economic situation of households, they may, in the absence of complementary measures, reproduce dynamics of dependency.

The evidence so far does not support the claim that programs such as Familias en Acción or Bolsa Família systematically become instruments of abuse. Rather, what the studies show is that there are real risks of transfers being subject to control or appropriation, and that these risks materialize in specific contexts or within certain subgroups of the population. For this reason, international organizations and academic reviews recommend incorporating gender safeguards into the design and implementation of the programs. These include anticipating the risks of gender-based violence, designing safe and confidential payment modalities, and complementing transfers with access to childcare, employment, and support services for women experiencing violence (Buller et al., 2018; World Bank, 2020).

In conclusion, conditional cash transfer programs have proven to be effective tools for poverty reduction, but their impact on women’s autonomy and intimate partner violence strongly depends on their institutional design and on the social context in which they are implemented. While transfers may help reduce violence by improving economic well-being, they may also fuel dynamics of control and dependency if the risks of economic abuse are not adequately addressed. Recognizing this ambivalence is essential to strengthening the programs and ensuring that the social inclusion they promote does not reproduce new forms of exclusion and abuse.

References

• Bobonis, G., Castro, R., & Morales, J. S. (2013). Conditional cash transfers for women and spousal violence: Evidence of the long-term relationship from the Oportunidades program in rural Mexico. Working paper.

• Bradshaw, S., & Víquez, A. (2008). Transferencias condicionadas y género en América Latina. United Nations.

• Buller, A. M., Peterman, A., Ranganathan, M., Bleile, A., Hidrobo, M., & Heise, L. (2018). A mixed-method review of cash transfers and intimate partner violence in low- and middle-income countries. The Lancet Global Health, 6(1), e62–e74.

• Molyneux, M. (2006). Mothers at the service of the new poverty agenda: Progresa/Oportunidades, Mexico’s conditional transfer programme. Social Policy & Administration, 40(4), 425–449.

• UN Women. (2021). Economic autonomy to escape a situation of violence. United Nations.

• World Bank. (2020). Safety first: Guidelines on cash transfers and gender-based violence risk mitigation in COVID-19 response. Washington, DC: World Bank.